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Abstract: We return to the traditional theme of the distributive consequences of international prices 
and trade policies, focusing on economies relatively abundant in natural resources with a large non-
tradable-goods sector. Changes in international prices create an aggregate demand effect which impacts 
on the earnings of factors employed in the non-traded goods sector. We show that, in economies highly 
specialized in the production of tradable goods and where the import-competing sector is small, under 
standard assumptions, terms-of- trade shifts have a neutral effect on factor prices and thus lack 
distributive effects, quite differently from Stolper-Samuelson scenarios. In economies with sizable 
import-competing sectors and two “urban” productive factors (e.g., skilled and unskilled labor), changes 
in the terms of trade do induce distributional tensions through two channels: (i) the exogenous shift in 
the relative price of tradable goods, and (ii) the endogenous displacement of the demand for non-
tradables. We illustrate how, according to the structure of the economy, different patterns of income 
distribution may arise. Next, we analyze the introduction of trade duties. Trade taxes change relative 
prices between tradable goods as a terms-of-trade shock does, but also introduce an additional demand 
mechanism, that depends on the use the government gives to the revenues. If the tax revenues are 
transferred back to the private sector, the resulting reallocation of spending favors those factors used 
intensively in the production of non-tradables.   
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1. Introduction 
The proposition that the distributive implications of international trade are shaped by external 
conditions, the policy setup, and the economy´s configuration in terms of production and 
consumption has been a matter of analytical concern for a long time, especially since the 
appearance of the celebrated theorem of Stolper and Samuelson (1941). Much has happened 
since then in terms of both foreign trade patterns and the associated theory. Instead of 
considering economies composed of large sectors operating in competitive markets and 
characterized by the intensity of their use of a possibly small set of factors of production, the 
recent literature stresses the heterogeneity of goods and factors, and the behavior of firms that 
market differentiated goods subject to a less than fully elastic demand.  
The latter approach accounts for the enormous diversity of goods and services involved in 
cross-border exchanges and the growing importance of innovative rents as sources of income. 
Yet, the simple Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson (HOS) framework retains its usefulness for a 
significant array of interesting distributional problems. The argument that foreign trade tends 
to focus on an economy´s abundant factors (whether raw materials, at one extreme, or, at the 
other, sophisticated skills that can be used to push out the production frontier in terms of 
design and technologies) seems to be a robust proposition even today. Some of the salient 
changes seen in the international economy in recent decades include a steep increase in the 
labor supply in activities that are integrated into world trade, along with an increase in the 
relevance of production value chains. The commodity ‘super cycle’ observed throughout most 
of the first decade of this century is another noticeable phenomenon. These developments 
have contributed significantly to strengthen the interest on the study of the effects of 
international trade and globalization on income distribution, particularly through changes in the 
skill premium (see for example Acemoglu, 2002, Stiglitz, 2002). 
In a number of developing countries, the tensions between the owners of natural resources, 
industrial capital, and different types of labor have traditionally been, and continue to be, a 
conspicuous feature of the economic and political landscape. These distributional conflicts also 
help to shape attitudes towards strategic policy choices, especially regarding the role of these 
economies in international markets. At times tensions may become severe. The social stresses 
apt to arise in the event of large changes in the prices of tradable goods, even in countries 
benefiting from terms-of-trade improvements, sometimes reach dramatic proportions. 
Instances of these effects can be found for example in the commodity boom of the early 2000s. 
Such types of social conflicts have been recognized as potentially deleterious for economic 
growth (see, among others, Rodrik, 1999). Against this backdrop, our main contribution is to 
study the effects of world prices and trade policies on factor incomes and distributive tradeoffs 
in economies where exportable sectors are intensive in natural resources, paying particular 
attention to the role of activities producing exclusively for the domestic market.  
In the simple Stolper-Samuelson setup of a small open economy with only tradable goods, 
demand conditions for domestic outputs are completely specified by world prices. Factor 
incomes vary with international prices according to factor intensities in each sector, 
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independently of whether they produce exportable or importable commodities. However, the 
existence of non-tradable goods in the economy implies that aggregate income effects have an 
impact as well. Factor prices are also influenced by the level of domestic spending. This induces 
an asymmetry between the effects of changes in the international terms of trade on real factor 
incomes since, for given factor intensities in traded-goods industries, there would be a 
complementarity between revenues in non-tradable activities and the relative prices of 
exportable vis-à-vis importable goods. In countries with a high degree of specialization in the 
production of traded goods, where import-competing sectors are relatively small and at the 
same time there is a sizable non-traded goods sector (the demand for which depends on the 
level of expenditure of producers of the exportable good), improvements in the terms of trade 
will result in widespread increases in real factor earnings. In the case of economies with a 
different type of production structure, however, stronger terms of trade need not be favorable 
for all social groups, since the Stolper-Samuelson effect of the relative price of tradable goods 
combines with the aggregate demand consequences of the rise in national real income. 
For simplicity, we disregard intertemporal considerations and, hence, the analysis of 
accumulation and growth, as well as that of international capital movements. We pursue the 
discussion within a static framework which focuses on what may be considered “medium-term” 
effects; that is, those that would be induced after reallocations in demand and production have 
taken place. In our benchmark case, we also simplify the analysis by considering the standard 
case of unitary price elasticities of substitution, both in production and consumption. While 
differences in consumption patterns certainly play an important role in the distributive 
implications of price changes, we disregard these effects to focus on those deriving from 
production channels ̀	 Stolper-Samuelson. 
Our analysis can be adapted to economies with several different configurations. However, for 
the sake of concreteness and expositional clarity, we focus on the case that seems most 
relevant for an important group of natural-resource-abundant countries. The representation of 
the production structure considers three types of goods. These include (i) a primary, exportable 
commodity, produced using as inputs land and unskilled labor; (ii) urban non-tradable 
goods/services; and (iii) industrial goods produced by an import-competing manufacturing 
industry. Both urban activities employ unskilled and skilled labor, albeit with different relative 
intensities. Introducing a specific factor in the manufacturing industry (“industrial capital”) does 
not substantially alter the analysis.  
In the simplest case, the economy produces only the exportable and non-traded goods. This 
setting corresponds to countries well-endowed with natural resources and very open to 
international trade, where urban activities related to the production of non-traded goods are 
supported by the demand derived from natural resource-related income, while import-
competing activities are not profitable. One could also think of economies where industrial 
activities operate under such high levels of protection that they behave effectively as non-
tradable sectors, and where imports of manufactures consist only of goods not produced 
locally.  
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For such configurations we show that, with homothetic preferences, when the economy 
receives a terms-of-trade shock, the effect is neutral in terms of income distribution. There is 
no distributive Stolper-Samuelson-type shift in relative factor prices, and the relative prices 
between locally produced goods remain unchanged. Thus, once the demand responses to 
international prices have taken place, a terms-of-trade shock would not trigger distributive 
conflicts among the different socioeconomic groups (although such conflicts may arise during 
the transition if the effects on spending on non-traded goods do not emerge instantaneously). 
This result is robust to the assumption of a representative consumer if manufactured goods are 
used as inputs rather than only for consumption. However, factor prices would not change in 
equal proportions when consumption demands are not characterized by unitary elasticities. If 
demand for the non-traded good were highly income elastic, however, the share of spending 
on that good would rise with higher export prices, increasing the earnings of skilled labor. In the 
latter case, following a positive shock on the price of the natural resource good, it would be 
possible for an “urban” factor to receive the largest increase in income.  
The effects of a terms-of-trade shift are non-neutral in a diversified economy that produces all 
three goods, with a manufacturing sector that operates as a price taker in international 
markets. An increase in the relative price of good A benefits the factor used specifically in the 
production of the exportable good, as expected. The incomes of the “urban” factors are now 
subject to a Stolper-Samuelson tradeoff associated with the (endogenous) change in the 
relative prices of non-tradables and manufactures. The income of one urban factor declines 
unambiguously (in terms of the three goods). If, for example, unskilled labor is used with 
relative intensity in the production of manufactures (as opposed to skilled labor being used 
intensively in the non-tradable sector), then unskilled workers see their relative wage drop as 
export prices increase. Skilled labor, however, would be comparatively better-off. Seen from 
this angle, the skilled workers’ interests would appear to be more closely aligned with those of 
the natural resources-owning class rather than with those of unskilled workers. Therefore, the 
distributional effects of changes in international prices would hinge on the relative skill 
intensity of “urban” goods. 
We also study the impact of a trade tax that lowers the domestic relative price of the 
exportable primary good, at constant international prices. In this two-sector economy, skilled 
workers, if employed intensively in the production of non-tradables, may favor the application 
of taxes to foreign trade, but only to the extent that tax revenues are spent in a way that raises 
the demand for the urban good. Such incentives would tend to fade away, however, if the main 
demand for the services that employ skilled labor comes from the spending of the landlord 
group. This also holds true for the case in which tax revenues are returned to the private sector 
in proportion to income shares. In the three-sector economy, a trade tax naturally reduces the 
return to the factor specific to the production of the primary good; unskilled workers gain if 
their labor is used intensively in the import-competing manufacturing sector and lose if their 
labor is used intensively in the non-tradable sector.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section puts our analytical work in 
perspective with the existing literature; it also presents evidence concerning the factor 
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intensities of different urban activities in Latin American economies, and about observed 
patterns of distributive changes associated with swings in international prices. Section 3 deals 
with the effects of terms-of-trade shifts on income distribution for the two-and three-sector 
economy models, while Section 4 considers the consequences of trade taxes. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
2. On previous literature and some empirical evidence   
This paper is related to the traditional “dependent economy” macroeconomic literature. This 
body of analysis focuses on the effects of relative price shifts between traded and non-traded 
goods on real activity and income distribution in economies that export land-intensive primary 
goods (see Salter, 1959, Swan, 1960, and Diaz Alejandro, 1965). Our arguments also build on 
the work in economic development and international trade that explores and qualifies the 
traditional Stolper–Samuelson results.  
Early developments of the HOS model extended the original theorems to the general case of 
many factors and tradable goods (see Johnson, 1957). Ethier (1984) presents a comprehensive 
survey of this body of literature. McDougall (1970) and Komiya (1967) made relevant 
contributions to this line of analysis by introducing non-tradable goods; their results were later 
extended by Ethier (1972). Komiya considers a small open economy that produces two tradable 
goods and one non-tradable good using two factors of production (capital and labor), both of 
which are mobile across sectors. He finds conditions under which the factor price equalization 
theorem, Rybczynski’s theorem, and Metzler’s theorem all hold. In connected work, Deardorff 
and Courant (1990) analyze conditions for factor price equalization in the presence of a non-
traded good. Another relevant antecedent is Jones (1974), who studies the case of an economy 
with two factors of production and a single traded-good sector.  
Cassing (1977) extends the 3-goods/2-factors model to the case of monopolistic non-tradable 
goods, while Cassing (1978) adds to the model by taking into account transport costs. More 
recently, Thierfelder and Robinson (2002) consider a model with two production activities, two 
inputs, and three commodities (exportable, importable, and non-tradable), while Beladi and 
Batra (2004) study the effects of traded goods prices on income distribution in a model where 
the exportable and the importable sectors share the same factors of production (see also Beladi 
and Batra, 2008). Galiani et al. (2008) also focus on the impact of spillovers from higher exports 
on the domestic demand for non-tradables. They argue that in land-rich economies not 
engaged in import substitution, growth in the value of land-intensive production activities may 
provide incentives for elite-controlled governments to favor public education as a means of 
expanding the supply of skilled labor in service sectors.  
The connection between the skill premium and the process of globalization, and the potential 
effect of trade policies has been thoroughly discussed in Goldberg and Pavcnick (2006, 2016). In 
particular, they highlight the existence of differences in the impact of those policies on wages, 
depending on the degree of economic development (advanced vs. emerging), and features such 
as specific industrial configurations and the comparative mobility of labor between regions. On 
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his side, Acemoglu (2003) argues that the increase in the skill premium is in part a reflection of 
the diffusion of new technologies set in motion by globalization, which benefits skilled workers 
rather than the unskilled. Further evidence is presented by Williamson (2011).  
The arguments of this paper correspond to the intuition that the incomes of factors used 
intensively in the production of non-tradables tend to move in step with the performance of 
the exporting sector. Coble and Magud (2010) find support for this hypothesis in the case of 
Chile, a quite resource-abundant economy. They document that stronger terms of trade are 
associated with wider wage gaps between unskilled and skilled workers and that non-tradable 
sectors are relatively skilled-labor-intensive (see Figures 1 and 2). This last finding is consistent 
with Hermida (2015) who, based on data from household surveys, points out that in Argentina 
in 2013 the proportion of workers with more than high-school education was 23 percent in 
manufacturing, compared with about 42 percent in the service sectors; a substantial difference 
still appears if the public administration sector is excluded from the calculation. Similar patterns 
are reported for Colombia and Peru. 
 
Source: Coble and Magud (2010). 
 
Source: Coble and Magud (2010). 
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3. Distributive Effects of Terms-of-Trade Shifts  
3.1 Specialized Economies: A Simple Two-Sector Economy 
We first analyze the case of economies that specialize in the production of primary goods that 
are intensive in the use of natural resources, and that do not have a significant import-
competing sector. In these economies, the absence of a sector that produces the importable 
good eliminates the familiar Stolper–Samuelson effect. Thus, the standard distributional 
consequences that arise in the traditional model from changes in the international terms of 
trade are diluted, since the demand for the factors employed in the non-tradable sector 
depends on the revenues generated by the export sector. 
Production  
We consider a small, open economy that produces two goods: an agricultural good () and a 
non-traded () good. The quantities of output are labeled  and		, respectively. The world 
price of the agricultural good, 
, is exogenously given, as is the price of the non-produced 
imported good , 
, which serves as the numeraire. Technology is represented by Cobb–
Douglas production functions: 
 = (, ) and (1) 
	 = (, ), (2) 
where  denotes agricultural land,  stands for raw labor, and  denotes an “urban” factor that 
we will assimilate with skilled labor. The price–cost equality derived from the assumption of 
perfect competition in all markets can be expressed in terms of proportional changes as: 

̂ = ̂ +  , (3) 

̂	 = 	ℎ + 	 , (4) 
where a circumflex above a variable denotes a proportional change. 
	 is the price of the non-
traded good,  is the return to factor , w is the wage rate, ℎ denotes the unit earnings of factor 
, and !" stands for the share of factor # in the unit cost of the production of good $. 
Factor Markets  
The economy is endowed with a fixed amount of factors of production. Given competitive 
factor markets, the equilibrium conditions can be characterized as: 
  = 0 = 
̂ + & − ̂ (5) 
  = 0 = ((
̂ + &) + (	(
̂	 + &	) −   (6) 
 ) = 0 = (
̂	 + &	) − ℎ  (7) 
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where (!" stands for the participation of sector $ in the employment of factor #, i.e., (! = !/. 
Since the incomes of the specific factors  and  are determined by constant shares of the 
values of production of the goods  and 	, respectively, their unit earnings vary in proportion 
to those prices. In the case of the mobile factor, , wages change according to a weighted 
average of the values of production in relation to the importance of the sector in total 
employment. 
Preferences and Consumption  
For analytical tractability, we assume homothetic preferences, thus ignoring the effects of 
incomes on the composition of demand. All individuals have identical Cobb–Douglas 
preferences over the consumption of the agricultural good +, the non-traded good +	, and the 
manufactured good +: 
,(+, +, +	) = +
-.+
-/+	
-0  (8) 
The parameters represent the constant proportions of spending allocated to the different 
goods. Without loss of generality, we assume that 1 + 1 = 1, so that these two coefficients 
measure the shares of the value of each tradable good in the total value of expenditures on 
traded goods. The individual's budget constraint is given by: 
3 = 
+ + 
	+	 + 
+ (9) 
where 3 is the income earned by the agent, as a function of factor prices , , and ℎ, as well as 
factor endowments. Optimal consumption is such that the value of spending on each of the 
three goods varies proportionally. Hence, in equilibrium: 

̂ + +̂ = +̂ = 
̂	 + +̂	 = 
̂	 + &	 (10) 
where the price of the manufactured good is fixed by the choice of numeraire, 
̂ = 0. 
Aggregate Constraints and Equilibrium 
The resource constraint for the non-traded good implies the equality of output and 
consumption, which is valid in levels and in terms of proportional changes: 
&	 = +̂	 (11) 
This is a static model that disregards intertemporal effects on spending. We therefore impose 
the condition of a zero trade balance, implying the equality of the proportional change in the 
value of the production of traded goods (here composed solely of good ) with the value of the 
consumption of tradables: 

̂ + & = 1(
̂ + +̂) + 1+̂ (12) 
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The equilibrium of the economy is defined as the state in which the aggregate constraints on 
production and consumption are satisfied, factor markets clear, and consumers and firms act 
optimally, as previously stated. 
Results 
It is straightforward to verify that, in equilibrium, the following results hold: 
 
̂ = 
̂	 = ̂ = ℎ =   (13) 
 +̂ = & = &	 = +̂	 = 0 (14) 
 +̂ = 
̂ (15) 
This can be summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. In the two-sector case, a positive terms-of-trade shock (
̂ > 0;	
̂ = 0) is 
neutral in the sense that there are no changes in relative factor earnings or in the relative prices 
of locally produced goods. The increase in the price of good , 
̂ > 0, triggers an equivalent 
increase in the demand for non-traded goods. Thus, there are no changes in resource 
allocation: the quantities that are produced do not vary. The only effect is a proportional 
increase in the purchasing power of all factors of production with respect to imports (); the 
increase in the volume of consumption of imported manufactures exactly matches the increase 
in purchasing power. 
Proof. Directly from (13)-(15) 
These results carry over when we add in another mobile factor, such as physical capital, 7. 
Remark 1. Effects of heterogeneous consumption baskets with homothetic preferences. 
Proposition 1 assumes that all agents share the same preferences characterized by a 
homothetic utility function. Heterogeneity in individuals’ preferences, maintaining the 
assumption of homotheticity, does not alter the neutrality of factor price changes. However, 
different preferences do affect the welfare implications of the shift in international prices. 
For example, assume that individual agents own a single factor of production and that they 
have Cobb-Douglas utility functions which are identical within groups but differ depending on 
the factor that generates earnings (so that utility parameters and spending shares are 
1"
!, $ = ,,, and # = , w, and h). The change in the value of consumption of the various 
goods will then be determined by the aggregate expenditure functions: 

̂" + +̂" = 1"
8̂ + 1"
9 + 1"	
:ℎ  (16) 
It can readily be seen that here, too, factor returns change proportionally: ̂ =  = ℎ = 
̂ =

̂	. Consequently, the welfare of all agents will still increase with an improvement in the 
international terms of trade. Nevertheless, the existence of differentiated consumption baskets 
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means that agents with consumption preferences biased toward good , i.e., higher 1; 	for 
I=, ℎ, and , will benefit relatively more. 
 
Remark 2. Imports as production inputs. 
The use of good  as a production input, rather than only as a consumption good, does not 
alter the income-distribution neutrality of the terms-of-trade shift obtained in Proposition 1. 
However, the presence of importable inputs implies that the physical production of goods 
changes following movements in international prices. This result is detailed in Appendix A. 
Remark 3. Non-unitary demand elasticities. 
The result of equal proportional changes in factor earnings would not hold if consumption 
demands were not characterized by unitary elasticities. For example, with a highly income-
elastic demand for the non-traded good, the spending share of that good would rise with 
higher export prices, which would tend to increase the earnings of the specific factor H. In such 
an economy, it would then be possible that, after a positive shock on the price of the 
agricultural good , an “urban” factor could receive the largest benefits in terms of income. 
Remark 4. Non-neutralities with transitional effects on demand. 
In a multi-period setup, the dynamics of spending may give rise to differences between the 
“short-run” and “medium-run” impacts of a permanent shift in the terms of trade. If, for 
instance, after an increase in the international price of good  there is a delay in the rise of 
domestic expenditures (in this context, if the higher export prices initially induce larger savings 
on the part of agricultural producers, resulting in a trade surplus, until eventually the additional 
income gets reflected in spending), the first effect on “urban” groups will take the form of a loss 
of purchasing power, as the agricultural consumption good becomes more expensive while the 
higher incomes of group T do not raise immediately the demand for non- tradables. Thus, the 
result of distributive neutrality would not hold during the transition. 
Remark 5. Terms-of-trade improvement: real appreciation, but no “Dutch disease.” 
An increase in the international price of good  implies an unambiguous rise in the price of the 
non-traded good relative to an index of the consumer prices of traded goods: 
<̂ = 1
̂ + 1
̂ − 
̂	 = −(1 − 1)
̂ < 0 (17) 
Thus, the improvement in the terms of trade brings about an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate (<). This reflects that the aggregate economy is relatively richer after the improvement in 
the terms of trade. However, in this economy there is no import-competing sector that could 
be affected by Dutch disease (see Gylfason (2008)). The real appreciation reflects higher 
incomes across sectors and factors. 
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3.2 Diversified Production: A Three-Sector Economy 
The existence of a sector that produces the imported good, , substantially modifies the 
distributional effects generated by changes in international prices and gives way to tensions 
between the incomes of the factors used in the traded-goods sectors.  
Production 
The three goods are now produced domestically. The (Cobb–Douglas) production functions are 
given by (1) and (2) for the agricultural (exportable) good and the non-traded good, 
respectively. The third sector competes with foreign products in the domestic market for 	. 
The  industry (manufacturing) is assumed to use labor and another “urban” factor 
(interpreted, as before, as skilled labor). Factor  is assumed to be mobile between the three 
sectors, while  can shift between manufactures and the non-traded sector. The production 
function of  is given by: 
  = >(, ) = 
?@/
?A/  (18) 
 
where  and  are the inputs of each factor in the production of good , and the 
parameters ! are the corresponding output elasticities or factor shares ( +  = 1). 
Under perfect competition, the price-cost equality implies, using good  as the numéraire 
(with equations analogous to (3) and (4) holding for the other two goods): 
 
̂ = 0 = ℎ +   (19) 
 
In the context of the following exercises, we shall generally assume that sector N is more 
skilled-labor intensive than M (	 > ), implying that manufacturing is comparatively 
unskilled-labor intensive. This corresponds, for example, to what is observed in several Latin 
American countries, as indicated referred to in the previous section. 
As before, an exogenous terms-of-trade shock is represented by a change in the world price of 
agricultural goods relative to those of manufactures (
̂ > 0, 
̂ = 0). 
Factor Markets 
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The supply of all the factors of production is fixed, and allocated among the sectors that use 
them. Given the production functions in (1), (2), and (18) above, the market clearing condition 
for land is given by (5), while those for  and  are now: 
The parameters (!" represent, as before, the share of sector $ in the total employment of factor 
#. 
Preferences and Consumption 
The demand side of the economy is the same as the one described in the discussion of the two-
sector economy. Given preferences in (8) and the flow budget constraint in (9), we obtain the 
same condition for the allocation of spending as in (10). 
Aggregate Constraints and Equilibrium 
Condition (11), which equates production and consumption of good , also holds in this case. 
The trade balance constraint or, equivalently, the equality between the value of production of 
traded goods and the value of consumption of those goods (in an economy without capital 
flows), is now given by the expression: 
 B(
̂ + &) + χ& = 1(
̂ + +̂) + γ+̂ (22) 
 
where B!  denotes the share of traded good # of the total value of tradable production, i.e., 
B! = 
!!/(
 + 
). Since  is the exported good, it must be the case that B > 1: its 
share in production is larger than its share in consumption. 
We define an equilibrium as a set of proportional changes in produced quantities E&, &	 , &F, 
volumes of consumption E+̂, +̂	 , +̂F, factor earnings G̂, , ℎ H, and the price of the non-traded 
good 
̂	 that satisfy (3), (4), (5), (10), (11), (19), (20), (21), and (22) for given changes in 
international prices E
̂, #ℎ	
̂ = 0F. 
Results 
Proposition 2. A Stolper-Samuelson distributive tradeoff arises in this economy between factors 
 and  (with the important proviso that, here, the change in the relative prices of both goods 
depend on 
̂	, which itself is determined endogenously): 
  = 0 = λ(
̂ + &) + λ	(
̂	 + &	) + λ& −   (20) 
 ) = 0 = λ	(
̂	 + &	) + λ& − ℎ  (21) 
 
ℎ =

Δ

̂	 
(23) 
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where Δ = 	 −  =  − 	. 
Proof. Directly from equations (4) and (19)  
Proposition 3. If the production of the non-traded good, , is more intensive in skilled labor 
(factor ) than the manufactured good,  (or equivalently, if sector  is relatively unskilled-
labor-intensive), then Δ > 0. In this case, an exogenous increase in the price of agricultural 
goods relative to manufactures results in an increase in the price of good  relative to the 
imported good . Earnings of skilled workers  increase unambiguously in terms of both 
goods,  and , while the return to factor  falls, also in terms of both goods. 
Proof. Directly from (23) and (24). 
In order to find a closed-form solution, the system can be reduced to two equations with 
variables ̂ (the proportional change in the unit rent on agricultural land) and & (the 
proportional change in output in the import-competing sector). 
 K(( + (	B) + L̂ + (( + (	B)& = 
̂ (25) 
 K(	B − L̂ + (( + (	B)& = −
̂ (26) 
 
It can further be shown (see Appendix B) that the determinant of this system, Ω´, is 
unambiguously positive. Hence, we can set out the following proposition: 
Proposition 4. In the three-good, three-factor economy described above, an increase in the 
international relative price of the agricultural good  implies: 
• An unambiguous (in terms of all three goods in the economy) increase in the return to 
factor , specific to the production of good . Thus, ̂ > 
̂ > 0 and ̂ > 
̂	. 
• A change in wages given by:   
O´	 9
P&.
= (λ(λ+λ	χ) + χQ(λRSλTU −	λRUλTS)) 
With O´>0 
• Production factors are reallocated such that agricultural output increases (& > 0) while 
output of the import-competing sector decreases (& < 0). 
Proof. See Appendix C 
 
 = −

Δ

̂	 
(24) 
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Factor T naturally benefits from the increase in the price of the agricultural good. The 
response of the other endogenous variables depends on the structure of the economy, 
which can be described by the parameters of factor shares of production and the 
distribution of factors and output across the various activities. The change in wages is 
determined by two different forces, given the “dual” nature of labor as an input to both 
sector A and “urban” activities. Thus, the higher prices of good A tend to attract labor to 
that sector, which drives wages up (although the real wage in terms of A necessarily falls). 
The latter effect is captured by the positive term λ(λ + λ	χ) in the previous 
equation. At the same time, factors L, H are involved in a “Stolper-Samuelson interaction” in 
sectors M, N, due to the reallocation of resources in the urban activities. This is reflected in 
the term χQ(λRSλTU −	λRUλTS), of	ambiguous	sign. For instance, if labor is used more 
intensively than H in the sector producing the importable manufactured good, this effect 
counterbalances the pull of demand from A, and may reverse the sign of the change in 
wages (in terms of good M). In this case, labor would be hurt unambiguously by the 
increase in the price of A, while factor H gains in its purchasing power over the urban goods.   
It is useful to map some limit cases in order to strengthen the economic intuition of the 
results. One especially salient distinction is between economies with very high and very low 
labor use in the  sector (“agriculture”), which correspond, respectively, to values of 
close to one or to zero. These cases could be interpreted, respectively, as economies 
with a “peasant” agriculture where the level of wages is basically determined by a 
technologically given the productivity of labor in the rural sector and, conversely, as 
countries where most of the population is employed in urban activities and the exportable 
sector is highly resource-intensive.  
• Sector 	A is labor intensive:  ≈ 1 
Here, L is the main “rural” factor, with a wage that varies more or less proportionally to 
the price of the A good. Consequently, labor participates fully in the income gains 
caused by the high price of A, while the urban factor H loses real purchasing power. 
•  Sector A has a very low labor intensity:  ≈ 0 and ( ≈ 0 
In this case the supply of good A is fixed, and the earnings of the specific factor vary in 
proportion to the price of the good: ̂ = 
̂. Labor is now a purely urban factor. The 
value (in terms of ) of the demand for non-tradables rises; this leads to a reallocation 
of resources from  to , which induces a redistribution of earnings between the 
factors used in these industries toward the one with a larger share in the non-traded 
sector (say, ); however, this does not prevent its purchasing power from falling in 
terms of A. The returns to the other factor (here, ) are lowered unambiguously in terms 
of the three goods.   
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4. Effects of Trade Taxes  
We now turn to the case where the change in the relative domestic prices of the traded goods 
derives from a policy intervention (at constant international prices) in the form of the 
introduction of an export tax, which lowers the local price of good . This intervention has two 
aspects: a change in the relative price of traded goods (which, from the point of view of 
economic agents, is analogous to an exogenous price shift originating in the international 
economy) and an appropriation of resources by the government, which can use them in 
different ways. The effects on production, consumption, and income distribution will depend 
on the use of the revenues generated by the tax. We concentrate on the case where tax 
proceeds are used “neutrally,” in that the government applies some or all of those resources to 
make lump-sum transfers to private agents in proportion to their original income levels. We 
allow for some part or all of those revenues to be kept as government savings (foreign asset 
accumulation) or to be spent directly on traded goods. The latter would reduce the demand for 
non-tradables relative to a situation in which all the tax revenues were transferred back to the 
private sector in the manner described earlier. 
In a setup that continues to disregard intertemporal considerations, a trade tax with non-
refunded revenues is equivalent to the terms of trade changes analyzed in the previous section. 
Domestic relative prices between tradable goods vary in the same fashion. The income derived 
from an increase in the international price of the importable good M which was previously 
appropriated by the foreign suppliers corresponds now to the tax revenues which, in this 
instance, the government is assumed to simply hold. Thus, the difference between the two 
cases (ToT and tax) derives from the use of the new government resources. The following 
discussion, consequently, focuses particularly on the effects of the tax refunds.  
4.1. Trade Taxes in a Specialized Two-Sector Economy  
The setup of the model is similar to the one described earlier in section 3.1, where the economy 
produces only goods  and . Starting from a situation with no taxes, the government applies a 
proportional duty α on exports of good , which implies 
̂ = −b. If the resulting tax revenues, 
τ, are expressed as a proportion of the value of output (or consumption) of traded goods, then: 
c = 1b (27) 
This results from the assumption of trade balance equilibrium in the original state. The value of 
exports of  is equal to the value of imports of , which in this case with no local production is 
equivalent to the domestic consumption of this good. The system is characterized by eqs. (3) to 
(10), where 
̂ is replaced by −b. The economy must also satisfy a trade balance condition at 
international prices. A fraction 1 − d of tax revenues is “kept” by the government and is neither 
made available to economic agents for use in financing consumption nor spent on non-traded 
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goods. Therefore, the budget constraint of the private sector can be written as an equality 
between the value of consumption of traded goods and the value of output of the traded good 
, net of the resources appropriated by the government: 
& − (1 − d)b1 = 1+̂ + 1+̂ (28) 
The fraction d of tax revenues is given back to private agents in proportion to their original 
incomes. This implies that the change in the after-transfer income of individual j is given by: 
3′) = 3f" + bd1′ (29) 
where 3f" denotes the proportional change in the price of the factor owned by the agent (  or 
̂	according to the case) and 1′ is the share of good M in total expenditures, including 
expenditures on non-traded goods.
5
 Combining eqs. (5), (10), and (28), it can be seen that 
changes in pre-transfer factor earnings satisfy: 
ℎ − (bd1 =  = ̂ + (	bd1 (30) 
Proposition 5. Changes in factor prices satisfy: ℎ ≥  ≥ ̂. This implies that export taxes 
redistribute income in favor of the factor used intensively in the production of the non-traded 
good relative to labor and, especially, relative to land. However, the distributive effect depends 
on the spending effects of the tax revenues, and it disappears if the parameter d	 = 	0, that is, 
if the use of those revenues does not bring about an increase in expenditure on the non-traded 
good. The redistribution would be associated with a reallocation of resources away from sector 
 and toward sector .  
The use of the revenues from the tax on international trade in the form of transfers has two 
implications: (i) an effect on market outcomes—and particularly on factor prices, via its 
implications for domestic demand—and (ii) a direct impact on the budget constraint of 
consumers. Combining those responses, changes in after-transfer earnings are given by: 
̂′
b
= −(1 + (	d1) + 1′d (31) 
ℎ ′
b
= (−1 + (1 − (	)d1) + 1′d (32) 
′
b
= −(1 − (	d1) + 1′d (33) 
                                                           
5
 This can be derived as follows. Let ∆3i and ∆3" ′ be the absolute change in the pre-transfer and post-transfer 
incomes of agent j, which were originally at the level 3", Y the total value of incomes at the initial state, and j the 
value of production of the traded good. Then, the assumption of a proportional distribution of tax revenues 
implies ∆3"
k = ∆3" + b1j(3" j)⁄ . Now, j j⁄ = m m⁄ = (1 − 1	), is the share of traded goods in total 
consumption. The expression in the text results using that 1′ = 1(1 − 1	) and that 3f"
′ = ∆3"
′/3". 
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Proposition 6. If all the revenues from the export tax are returned to the private sector in 
proportion to private agents’ income shares, so that d	 = 	1, the effects on disposable incomes 
would be as follows: 
• For the factor specific of sector  (): The transfer of funds to consumers raises the 
demand for non-tradables and tends to increase wages, which exacerbates the decline 
in the market earnings of factor . The direct effect of the tax refund works in the 
opposite direction on the disposable incomes of this group. In some cases (in the 
presence of a large non-tradable sector and when the agricultural sector is labor-
intensive), owners of factor  may prefer little or no refund of the tax revenues (due to 
their effect on factor prices) even if that means sacrificing the receipt of a direct transfer 
of resources. 
• For the factor specific of sector  (): The market remuneration and (a fortiori) the 
post-transfer income increase in terms of good .The tax refund favors this factor by 
raising the demand for H; however, this effect is insufficient to increase the market 
earnings of this factor in terms of importable goods. If production in the agricultural 
sector is sufficiently land-intensive (large ) and 1′ is relatively large, then, by eq. 
(32), ℎ ′ > 0, and the post-transfer incomes may rise in purchasing power over M and, 
consequently, over all three goods. 
• Market wages of the mobile factor () rise in terms of the exportable good. If labor is 
mainly an urban factor (with a small share in the  sector and a high proportion of 
employment going to the production of ), then this factor could increase its post-
transfer earnings in terms of . 
Proof. Directly from equations (31)-(33); using the fact that 1k = 1(1 − 1	k ), and that 
P&0
P&.
= −1 + d1(	((1 − (	) + 	(	) < 0. 
Thus, in such an economy, factor  may be in favor of the levying of taxes on foreign trade, but 
only to the extent that, in one way or another, the use of the tax revenues boosts demand for 
the non-traded good. Such incentives would tend to fade away if, as is the case in the land-rich 
economies studied by Galiani and others (2008), the main source of demand for the services 
that employ skilled labor is the expenditure of the landlord group . 
4.2 Trade Taxes in a Three-Sector Economy 
The aggregate budget constraint is now expressed by:  
B	&+B	& − (1 − d)b(B − 1) = 1+̂ + 1+̂ 
Or: 
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B	(−b + &)+B	& + bd(B − 1) = +̂ 
After some transformations, equations (25) and (26) can be modified as follows: 
 
 K(( + (	B) + L̂ + (( + (	B)& = −b − (	db(B − 1) 
 
K(	Bn − L̂ + (( + (	B)& = b −
(		db(B − 1) 
(34) 
 
 
(35) 
 
It can be seen that the only difference between the case of the shift in international prices and 
that of the trade tax is the addition in the RHS of the equations of the terms in db(B − 1), 
reflecting the effect of the tax refund as channeled through the economy´s external budget 
constraint and its effect on the demand for goods.  
The effect of the tax refund on the market earnings of factor T is determined by: 
O̂8op = O̂!q8+ (((	 − (	()	db(B − 1) 
In that expression the proportional change in the return to factor T after the application of a tax 
on foreign trade, ̂8op is equivalent to the change that would occur to that factor price if the 
international price of A had fallen at the rate b of the tax (̂!q8 <0, as seen before), plus the 
effect of the tax refund on the market income received by owners of factor T, which depends 
on the relative factor intensities in “urban” activities.   
The intuition of this result is reasonably simple. For a given price of A, the return to T varies 
negatively with the level of wages, . The transfers made using these tax revenues tend to 
boost the demand for non-tradables. If labor is used with more intensity in the production of 
the importable good than in sector N, the reallocation of urban production changes factor 
prices in favor of H and against labor. This, in turn, lowers costs in sector A, which tends to raise 
land rents. Thus, larger transfers would benefit T (and certainly factor , which is oriented 
toward the production of non-tradables), while pushing down wages. However, the effect of 
the transfer cannot offset the loss that factor T sustains as a result of the fall in the relative 
price of good A. 
A formula similar to (35) describes the change in wages (while the market return to factor H 
remains linked to the level of wages through the price-cost relation in sector M)   
O8op = O!q8-(((	 − (	()	db(B − 1)             (36)  
If L is used intensively (relative to H) in the production of the importable goods 	, the effect of 
the refund counterbalances the direct impact of the trade tax in stimulating the activity in that 
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sector, and strengthens the losses that L may have experienced by the lower demand for its 
services in the exportable sector.  
In order to better specify the effects, it is useful to consider some extreme cases 
• Sector A is very labor intensive:	 ≈ 1. 
The change in the relative price of traded goods favors factor H and hurts L: in this extreme 
case, market wages vary almost proportionally to the price of good  ( ≈ −b). The tax refund 
tends to raise the demand and the output of good N and to drive factor  away from the 
import-competing sector, which provides “urban employment” to labor, if it is used with 
comparative intensity in M.	 
• Sector A Sector  is very land intensive6:  ≈ 0. 
When the proceeds of the trade tax are kept by the government in the form of traded goods, 
the distributive effects of the rise in the price of good  relative to , which unambiguously 
hurts the specific factor , operate in favor of the urban factor used intensively in sector  (	, 
say), whose market earnings increase in terms of the three goods. The other urban factor () 
stands in an intermediate position, with earnings higher in terms of  but lower relative to the 
two other goods. When the tax revenue is used for transfers to consumers, the aggregate 
demand channel tends to equalize the returns to the two urban factors, as it strengthens the 
demand for that one () which is used intensively in the non-traded-goods sector. The 
consequent increase in the price of good N reduces the purchasing power of the owners of 
factor T, but this group benefits from the direct effect of the transfer. 
The following proposition summarizes outcomes of a tax/refund operation:  
Proposition 7. In a three-good, three-factor economy, a tax on foreign trade that lowers the 
price of A relative to  and the revenues of which are refunded to private agents in proportion 
to their initial incomes will result in: 
• A decrease in the market return to factor , specific to the production of good . The 
refund of the tax revenues may have a partially offsetting effect through an aggregate 
demand channel if, among urban factors (L and H), labor is used more intensively in the 
production of importable goods. However, this cannot reverse the sign of the change in 
unit rents. 
                                                           
6
 It may be noted that, in this case, the output of the exportable good would remain fixed. The reallocation of 
output as a consequence of the tax would be limited to the “urban sectors” producing import- substitutes and 
non- tradable goods. 
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• Labor is negatively affected as a “rural factor” by the lower price of good A, but gains 
from the higher demand for its services in the import-competing sector, if it is used 
intensively in this activity. In this case, however, the effect of the refund on factor prices 
would be directed against L and in favor of H. Labor would favor the tax if there is little 
employment in the A sector, and much in import-competing activities, and it would 
perceive unfavorable effects from measures that reshuffle urban resources from M to H. 
• Productive factors are reallocated in such a way that output of the import-competing 
sector increases (& > 0). The refund motivates a change in the composition of urban 
output in favor of non-traded goods, and away from importable goods, but production 
of these goods would still rise.   
Proof. See Appendix C 
5. Conclusions  
We have studied the distributive effects of shifts in international terms of trade and the 
introduction of export or import taxes on the basis of a conceptually simple HOS model with 
non-traded goods. Although the results can be generalized, we focus on land-abundant 
economies that export primary goods. The introduction of non-tradables enriches the analysis 
and gives it added relevance, since the employment of resources in production activities that 
cater exclusively to the local market induces a crucial association between domestic spending 
and factor demand and prices that is absent from the usual HOS framework. Specifically, we 
consider economies that could potentially produce three goods: a primary (exportable) good 
for which land and unskilled labor are the production inputs; a manufacturing good for which 
both unskilled and skilled labor are production inputs; and a non-tradable sector that also uses 
both unskilled and skilled labor.  
In our simplest case, the two-sector economy, no distributive Stolper–Samuelson effect results 
from a terms-of-trade shock: all factors gain from an improvement in international export 
prices. In the three-sector economy, however, the effects on relative incomes depend on factor 
intensities. A terms-of-trade improvement benefits the factor used specifically in the 
production of the exportable good. Nonetheless, given the endogenous change in the relative 
price of non-tradables and manufactures, the incomes of the urban factors are subject to a 
variant of the Stolper–Samuelson tradeoff. The income of the urban factor used intensively in 
the tradable good production declines unambiguously in relation to all three goods. 
We have also analyzed the income distribution effect of an export tax. In a two-sector 
economy, skilled workers (if employed intensively in the production of non-tradables) may be in 
favor of the application of taxes on foreign trade. However, this holds only to the extent that 
the use of the tax revenues ends up increasing the demand for the non-traded good, and taking 
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into account the income individuals receive as transfers out of the revenues collected by the 
government. Here, unskilled labor stands to lose from protection, since part of the demand for 
this type of labor originates in the agricultural sector.  
The nature and intensity of distributive tensions depend on the configuration of the economy. 
In the case of a country with no significant import-competing activity, those conflicts would 
appear to be diluted, as indicated by the neutrality results. This does not hold in a three-sector 
economy, however, since distributional conflicts can arise not only in the traditional “rural-
urban” dimension, but also between different “urban” production factors. These effects can be 
the outcomes of exogenous changes in international prices or they may be associated with 
trade policy decisions. The existence of non-traded goods implies that the redistributive 
consequences of those policies depend not only on the tax levels, but also on choices about 
spending that modify the relative price of the domestic good or, otherwise stated, operate on 
the value of the equilibrium exchange rate. Thus, our analysis can be used to describe the 
motivations and incentives of different groups in political economy games. This establishes a 
connection with a broader literature which emphasizes the role of international trade on 
domestic political cleavages and domestic policies and institutions. See, for example, Rogowski 
(1989) and O’Rourke and Taylor (2006); Galiani, Torrens, and Schofield (2014) present a formal 
political economy model for this issue.  
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Appendix A. Imports as Production Inputs in the Two-Sector Case 
Good M is now not only a consumer product but is also used as an input in the production of 
goods A and N. The proportional change in intermediate imports after a change in the price of A 
(with 
̂=0): 
) = λ(
̂ + &) + λ	(
̂	 + &	) − 
̂ 
The supply-demand conditions for primary factors L, T and H are still given by:  
 
The trade balance condition:  

̂ + & = (1 − r)1(
̂ + +̂) + (1 − r)γ+̂ +r)  
Cost-price equations:  

̂ = ̂ + +
̂ 

̂	 = 	 + 	ℎ +	
̂ 
It can be seen that these equations are satisfied if:  
̂ =  = ℎ = 
̂ + & = 
̂	 + y&U = +̂ = 
̂ + +̂ = ) =
1
1 − 

̂ 
and: 

̂	 =
tu?/@
tu?/.

̂,    y&U =
?/@
tu?/.

̂,   & =
?/.
tu?/.

̂ 
The change in the price of the exportable good has, as in the case in which there are no 
intermediate imports, neutral effects on the returns to the domestic factors. However, now 
factor earnings rise more than in proportion to the price of good A because of the expanded 
production opportunities created by the relative reduction in the cost of international inputs.  
 
  
  = 0 = λ(
̂ + &) + λ	(
̂	 + &	) −   
 = 0 = 
̂ + & − ̂ 
 
 
 
 ) = 0 = λ	(
̂	 + &	) − ℎ   
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Appendix B. Derivation of the Reduced System involving the Sign of 
the Determinant in the Three-Goods Case 
  
The supply-demand equations for production factors can be written as follows:  
Taking into account the assumed consumption demand functions and the supply-demand 
balance of non-tradable-goods: 

̂	 + &	 = 
̂	 + +̂	 = 
̂ + +̂ = +̂ 
The system then reduces to:  
λ̂ + λ	+̂ + λ& =

̂ −  ̂

 
λ	+̂ + λ&v −



̂ −  ̂

 
B̂ + χ& = +̂ 
or:  
(λ + )̂ + λ	+̂ + λ& = 
̂ 
−̂+λ	+̂ + 	λ&v − 
̂ 
 = 0 = λ(
̂ + &) + λ	(
̂	 + &	) + λ& −   
 = 0 = 
̂ + & − ̂ 
 
 
) = 0 = λ	(
̂	 + &	) + λ& − ℎ  

̂ = ̂ +   

̂ = 0 =  + ℎ  
B(
̂ + &) + χ& = 1(
̂ + +̂) + γ+̂ 
 
Price equations for A and M: 
 
 
 
Trade balance: 
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B̂ + χ& = +̂ 
leading to:  
((λ + λ	B) + )̂ + (λ + λ	χ	)& = 
̂ 
(λ	B − )̂ + (λ+λ	χ) = 	−
̂ 
The determinant of this system is:  
Ω= ((λ + λ	B) + )	(λ+λ	χ)	 − (λ	B − )(λ +
λ	χ	)	 
It can be seen that the only negative term is a multiple of λ	B . Collecting the terms 
in λ	: 
(λ + λ	B)λ	χ + λ	χ −
(λ + λ	χ)λ	B=λ	(((λ + λ	B)χ −
(λ + λ	χ)B)+	χ) 
This reduces to: 
λ	((λ + )χ − λB) 
But:  
χ =



 + 

=









 +





=
λ
λ + λ
=
λ
w
 
And a similar expression for B.   
Then: 
(λ + )χ − λB =
xA/?A.
p
(λ +  − λ) =
xA/?A.
p
	((1 −
λ)+	λ) > 0 
Therefore, Ω is unambiguously positive. 
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Appendix C.  Proof of Proposition 4 and Related Results 
Proof that 
8f
P&.
> 0	and  y&/
P&.
≤ 0 
Using the reduced system shown in Appendix B, it follows that: 
Ω
8f
P&.
= (λ+λ	χ) + (λ + λ	χ	) > 0 
Ω 
y&/
P&.
= −((λ + λ	B) + ) − (λ	B − ) = −(λ +
λ	B)	 − λ	B<0 
Proof that   
8f
P&.
≥ 1 
This result is equivalent to 
̂ + & ≥ 
̂ or & ≥ 0. The system can be rearranged as: 
 
((λ + λ	B) + )& + (λ + λ	χ	)& = 
̂(1 − (λ + λ	B) + ) 
(λ	B − )& + (λ+λ	χ)& =	−
̂( + (λ	B −
)) 
 which implies:  
Ω	 y&.
P&.
=
(1 − ((λ + λ	B) + ))	(λ+λ	χ) +
(λ + λ	χ	)(λ	B + ) > 0 
because (λ + λ	B) +  < 1 
Expression for {  
The system can be rearranged (taking into account that ̂ = P&.u?A.9
?|.
) to give:  
 
((λ + λ	B) + ) − (λ + λ	χ	)& = 
̂(λ + λ	B) 
−(λ	B − ) + (λ+λ	χ) = 	−
̂λ	B 
In a similar fashion to what was done before, it can be shown that the determinant of this 
system is positive:  
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O´ = ((λ + λ	B) + )(λ+λ	χ) −	(λ + λ	χ	)(λ	B −
) > 0 
Then:  
O´ 9
P&.
=(λ + λ	B)	(λ+λ	χ) −	λ	B(λ + λ	χ) 
Which can be reduced to an expression with an ambiguous sign: 
O´	 9
P&.
= (λ(λ+λ	χ) + B(λλ	 −	λ	λ)) 
Limit cases 
1. Sector  labor intensive:  ≈ 1 
 
In the limit:  = 
̂, 	ℎ) = −
?A/
?@/

̂ 
 
The value of spending on good N (in terms of M) and the volume consumption of M may 
increase or fall depending on the parameters. To clarify this, it is useful to rewrite the 
system as: 
(λ + λ	B)+̂ + +(Bλ − Bλ)& = B
̂ 
λ	+̂ + λ	& = − 	
̂ 
The determinant O´´ can be shown to be positive. Now: 
O´´
+̂

̂
= (	B + 	(Bλ − Bλ) 
Recalling the expressions for B, B: 
O´´ }̂/
P&.
= ?A/	xA.
p
((	+λ(	 − 	))=	
?A/	xA.
p
((	 − λ) 
So that the sign of +̂ depends on that of the difference in factor uses in sector: (	 − λ. 
2. Sector , with very low labor intensity:  ≈ 0, λ ≈ 0 
 
Now, 
8f
P&.
= 1, & = 0 
The system can be written: 
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 −(λ+λ	χ)	&=λ	B
̂ 
 
	+(λ+λ	χ)& = −λ	B
̂ 
 
The determinant Ω´´´ is positive. Now,  
 
Ω´´´ 9
P&.
= B(λ	(λ + λ	χ) − λ	(λ+λ	χ))  
 
Or:  
 
Ω´´´ 9
P&.
= B(λ	λ − λ	λ)=	B(λ	 − λ	) 
 
Then, 
9
P&.
> 0 if sector N is comparatively L- intensive. However, 9
P&.
< 1 whatever the 
value of λ	 − λ	. 
 
It can also be shown that: 
 
Ω´´´ P&0
P&.
= 	Ω´´´
9
P&.
+	 	Ω´´´
:)
P&.
> 0 
 
That is so because:  
 
Ω´´´

̂	

̂
= B(λ	 − λ	)(		 − 	) = B(λ	 − λ	)(	 − ) > 0 
Also: 
P&0
P&.
< 1 since, as indicated before, both  9
P&.
< 1 and  :
)
P&.
< 1. 
It can also be seen that:  
 
Ω´´´
+̂

̂
= B(λ + λ) > 0 
 
and:  
Ω´´´
+̂	

̂
= B~(λ + λ) − (λ	 − λ	)(	 − )
= B(λ	 + λ	) > 0 
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Appendix D. Effects of the tax refund in the three-goods case 
Recalling equations (34) and (35), the system that determines the effect of the trade tax and 
refund policy can be written as:  
K(( + (	B) + L̂ + (( + (	B)& = −b − (	db(B − 1) 
 
K(	B − L̂ + (( + (	B)& = b − (		db(B − 1) 
Thus, the change of the endogenous variables ̂, & is a combination of the response that 
would hold in the case of a terms-of-trade shift of magnitude –α, and the effect of the refund  
db(B − 1):  
 O̂8op = O̂!q8+ (((	 − (	()	db(B − 1) 
O&8op = O&!q8 − ((	(( + ) + (	))	db(B − 1) 
Where O is the positive determinant. Similar expressions can be found for variables like	  and 
+̂:  
O8op = O!q8- (((	 − (	()	db(B − 1) 
O+̂8op = 	O+̂!q8 + ((( + )( + ()	db(B − 1) 
 
It can also be verified that 
8f

 < 0:  
8f

= −(( + (	B) − (( + (	B) +	(((	 −
(	()	d(B − 1) 
The only positive term is proportional to (	. Comparing the analogous terms and 
remembering the expressions for B, B 
((	d(B − 1) -(	B<(	(B( − B) < 0 
 
Also: 
y&/

> 0:  
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y&/

= B((	 + (	) +	(( + ) - − 	d(B −
1)(	(( + )	(	+(	) > B(((	 + (	) −
(( + )	(	−(	 )>0 
 
 
 
 
 
